{"id":274,"date":"2022-11-22T12:37:25","date_gmt":"2022-11-22T11:37:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/italiarappginevra.esteri.it\/la-conferenza-del-disarmo\/"},"modified":"2026-03-24T11:21:32","modified_gmt":"2026-03-24T10:21:32","slug":"la-conferenza-del-disarmo","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/italiarappdisarmo.esteri.it\/en\/il-disarmo\/la-conferenza-del-disarmo\/","title":{"rendered":"The Conference on Disarmament"},"content":{"rendered":"

Main Statements<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The Italian Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament (20 January-14 February 2025)<\/strong><\/p>\n

After eleven years, Italy assumed the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) from 20 January to 14 February 2025, under the monthly rotation mechanism among the 65 Member States. The Italian Presidency coincided with a particularly challenging period for international relations and the global architecture of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation.<\/p>\n

Despite these difficult circumstances, at the third plenary meeting held on 30 January, the CD approved by consensus Decision CD\/2443<\/a> establishing the Programme of Work, the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs), and their coordinators. Not since 1996 had such an agreement been reached in January during the first Presidency of the year.<\/p>\n

Thanks to the transparency and openness to dialogue promoted by the Italian Delegation, consensus gradually emerged on the draft decision. This enabled the launch, for the first time in almost thirty years, of the work of the Subsidiary Bodies as early as January, with activities continuing throughout the 2025 session.<\/p>\n

The topics identified as priorities within the individual bodies were as follows:<\/p>\n

– SB1 (Ending the arms race and nuclear disarmament)<\/strong>: Current international security environment and nuclear doctrines; risks of a nuclear arms race; goals and objectives for nuclear disarmament and updates on the process aimed at ending the nuclear arms race (intermediate goal) and achieving nuclear disarmament (ultimate goal); practical measures for nuclear disarmament, including elements on transparency, irreversibility and verifiability; confidence-building measures (CBMs) and nuclear risk reduction and verification of nuclear disarmament; legal framework and other legal instruments related to the nuclear disarmament process.<\/p>\n

– SB2 (Prevention of nuclear war):<\/strong> Developments in the prevention of nuclear war, including practical measures for the non-use of nuclear weapons; proposals on a multilateral instrument to prevent nuclear war, including general, technical and institutional considerations and other related aspects.<\/p>\n

– SB3 (Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space-PAROS):<\/strong> Continuation of the debate on threats to the security of space activities and systems; assessment of the existing regulatory and legal framework, taking into account the latest working documents, including the Final Report of the Group of Governamental Experts on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (GGE-PAROS, 2024), the United Nations Disarmament Commission document (UNDC, 2023), and recent discussions within the CD; review of existing and potential initiatives on PAROS; consideration of further measures to prevent an arms race in outer space; and identification and definition of key terms.<\/p>\n

– SB4 (International agreements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons)<\/strong>: Continuation of the discussion on existing security assurances; possible principles for the development and elements of effective international agreements to protect non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n

– SB5 (New types of weapons of mass destruction, radiological weapons, global disarmament programme, and transparency in armaments):<\/strong> Continuation of the debate on radiological weapons; current and emerging challenges in the field of chemical and biological weapons; transparency in armaments, including nuclear strategies, doctrines and policies; scientific and technological developments with implications for disarmament and international security.<\/p>\n

The agreement promoted by Italy and approved by consensus by all CD Member States represents a significant step forward in revitalizing a body that had long been unable to promote new negotiations due to the divergent positions and mutual vetoes among its Members. It also stands as a sign of the resilience of multilateralism, which has been severely tested in recent years by mounting global and regional tensions.<\/p>\n

The Italian CD Presidency concluded on 14 February and was passed to Japan, the next Member State in alphabetical order under the monthly rotation mechanism. The work of the Subsidiary Bodies continued until the close of the 2025 session in September.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0Conference on\u00a0Disarmament: history, role\u00a0and methods\u00a0of work<\/strong><\/p>\n

Established in 1979 as a result of the First Special Session on Disarmament of the UN General Assembly (SSOD-I)<\/span><\/a>, the Conference on Disarmament (CD)<\/span><\/a> is the foremost multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament and non-proliferation. It originated from the first multilateral body set up by the UN in this field: the Committee of the Eighteen. This Committee was created in 1962 and composed of 18 Member States under the joint chairmanship of the United States and the Soviet Union. The membership was expanded to thirty States in 1969, when the body was renamed \u201cCommittee of the Conference on Disarmament\u201d (CCD).<\/p>\n

Today, the Conference on Disarmament is based in Geneva and consists of 65 Member States and 38 Observer States. It includes the five permanent Members of the Security Council (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States), as well as the most militarily advanced States. The Members of the Conference respresent the major geographical groups within the United Nations: 24 States (including Italy) belong to the Western European and Others Group (WEOG); 34 are part of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); and 7 belong to the Eastern European group. China is a Group of One.<\/p>\n

Traditionally, countries that express interest are invited to participate in the proceedings of the CD as observers. In line with established practice, the CD approves a single list of requests from approximately 40 countries at the beginning of each session. In recent years, however, this practice has occasionally been abandoned. In 2023, the Russian Federation objected to the single-list approach, advocating for individual consideration of requests. In the absence of agreement, the 2023 session did not include any observer participation, including 12 Member States of the European Union. Most recently, in January 2024, the Russian Federation opposed the participation of all EU and NATO countries that are not CD Members but had requested observer status (eleven EU Member States – Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia – as well as three candidate countries: Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro). Israel and the United States opposed the participation of Palestine, while Turkey objected to that of Cyprus. A similar scenario occurred in 2025, with the Russian Federation again blocking the participation of all EU and NATO countries that are not CD Members and with Turkey opposing Cyprus’ request.<\/p>\n

Although established by the United Nations General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament functions as an independent entity with its own rules and procedures (albeit funded through the UN budget). Its activities are organized into three sessions per year: the first session lasting ten weeks, and the following two lasting seven weeks each. The Presidency of the Conference rotates monthly, in alphabetical order, among its Member States. The Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament is appointed by the UN Secretary-General and is the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva. At the end of each annual session, the Secretary-General of the CD transmits a report on the Conference\u2019s work to the General Assembly and ensures the implementation of any recommendations.<\/p>\n

The Conference on Disarmament\u2019s permanent agenda – commonly reffered to as the \u201cDecalogue\u201d – encompasses a broad range of issues related to disarmament and arms control. Each year, the CD adopts a more specific agenda including the following topics:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;<\/li>\n
  2. Prevention of nuclear war;<\/li>\n
  3. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS);<\/li>\n
  4. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (Negative Security Assurances \u2013 NSAs);<\/li>\n
  5. New types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, including radiological weapons;<\/li>\n
  6. Comprehensive Program of Disarmament;<\/li>\n
  7. Transparency in armaments.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Historically, the Conference on Disarmament\u2014and particularly its predecessor bodies\u2014has served as the primary forum for the most significant multilateral disarmament agreements concluded by the international community since the post\u2013World War II era. Among the most notable outcomes are the Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Underwater (Partial or Limited Test Ban Treaty \u2013 PTBT or LTBT); the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty \u2013 NPT); the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention \u2013 BTWC); the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention \u2013 CWC); and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which pursue the goal of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons testing.<\/p>\n

    Since the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, consensus among CD members has not been reached to begin negotiations on the remaining agenda items. Divergent views have emerged, in particular, on a potential negotiating mandate for a treaty banning the production of fissile material (Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty \u2013 FMCT), especially regarding its possible scope \u2013 whether or not include existing stocks of fissile material \u2013 and the means of verification and monitoring.<\/p>\n

    The persistent political deadlock within the Conference has prevented its Members from adopting a Programme of Work (POW) for more than two decades – a situation often attributed to its fundamental rule of procedure: \u201cthe Conference conducts its work and adopts its decisions by consensus”.<\/em> During this prolonged stalemate, the Conference has continued to meet in both plenary and informal sessions, allowing for sustained exchanges of views among major actors on the global political and military stage, and the continued development of technical expertise on key disarmament and arms control issues.<\/p>\n

    Among recent efforts to overcome the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, an informal retreat held in Montreux on 22\u201323 June 2023 is particularly noteworthy. The meeting was organized by UNIDIR<\/a> with the joint support of the French and German Presidencies of the CD. On this occasion, participants discussed a range of possible measures – from minor practical improvements to significant structural reforms. At the conclusion of the retreat, UNIDIR presented a report<\/a>, which was subsequently taken up in informal discussions within the CD. Italy\u2019s position was outlined in Ambassador Bencini\u2019s statement<\/a> during the CD debate on 17 August 2023.<\/p>\n

    The 2024 session concluded under the Presidency of Israel with the adoption of a report ensuring continuity between that session and the following one. It\u00a0 recommended that the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) established during the 2024 session resume their work in 2025 on the basis of the same mandate and with the same coordinators.<\/p>\n

    As indicated in the previous section on the Italian Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, the 2025 session opened in January under Italy\u2019s leadership.<\/p>\n

    The 2026 session opened under the presidency of Mongolia<\/span><\/span>, which sought to ensure continuity in the Conference\u2019s work by referring to decision CD\/2443 of 2025. In this context, the Presidency presented a draft decision aimed at re-establishing the five subsidiary bodies, with the objective of making the work of the Conference on Disarmament<\/span><\/span> more efficient and structured, while capitalizing on the lessons learned over the course of the previous year. However, Russia<\/span><\/span> made its support conditional upon the prior definition of a rigid list of issues to be discussed, as well as an advance agreement on the structure of the subsidiary bodies\u2019 final reports. Despite the Presidency\u2019s efforts to bridge the differences, the 1770th plenary meeting confirmed the absence of the unanimous consensus required for the formal re-establishment of the subsidiary bodies. In light of this impasse, the Presidency announced that the work of the 2026 session will, for the time being, proceed in the form of thematic discussions in plenary session, setting aside the subsidiary body model.<\/p>\n

    During the month of February 2026, two events significantly marked the work of the Conference: the interventions of the U.S. Under Secretary of State Thomas G. DiNanno<\/span><\/span> (6 February) and the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi<\/span><\/span> (17 February).<\/p>\n

    In his statement, DiNanno underscored the need to involve Russia<\/span><\/span> and China<\/span><\/span> in trilateral negotiations aimed at establishing new limits on nuclear weapons, noting that China\u2019s arsenal is not currently subject to transparency or verification mechanisms. He also stressed the importance of defining a new multilateral arms control framework, in light of repeated Russian violations and the increase in global nuclear stockpiles following the expiration of the New START Treaty.<\/p>\n

    In his address to the Conference on Disarmament, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi referred instead to the opening of a \u201cnew window of opportunity\u201d in nuclear negotiations with the United States<\/span><\/span>, following the second round of talks held in Geneva with the mediation of countries from the region. The head of Iranian diplomacy expressed the hope that the ongoing dialogue could lead to a negotiated and lasting resolution of tensions between the two countries, to the benefit of regional stability.<\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    Main Statements<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

    2026<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Amb. Leonardo Bencini<\/p>\n