



Permanent Mission of Italy to
the Conference on Disarmament
Geneva

**Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS)**

2-6 March 2026

Section I - Definitions and Characterizations

Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor and for this revised version of the rolling text. The task of our Group is “to further consider and formulate, by consensus, a set of elements of an instrument”. This instrument should try to adopt a functional approach focused more on a scope of application rather than physical characteristics and, in our view, we are moving towards the right direction.

With regard to **Section I**, we support the retention of the phrase “*within the scope of the application of the CCW*”, as it clearly defines the parameters of the future instrument. We also welcome the addition of “*and for the purpose of these elements*”, which further clarifies and strengthens the objectives of the text.

As we have underlined on previous occasions, we consider that a lethal autonomous weapons system is one which, once activated, can identify, select, and engage targets without further human intervention—thus implying the use of “autonomy” across all the three critical phases. While we are cognizant of the divergences that persist on this issue, we believe that the current formulation brings us closer to a consensus definition.

Turning to **paragraphs A, B, and C**, we note with appreciation that the text specifies that a system which is lethal by nature cannot be excluded from characterization, even when used to damage objects or inflict injury, or when it requires initial parameter input from an operator. We view this as a balanced and pragmatic compromise, consistent with the discussions held over the past year. Since the definition of “lethality” still reflects differing perspectives, the current approach offers a constructive way forward by deferring detailed characterization to the future negotiation of the instrument among the High Contracting Parties.

We would encourage applying this same approach to the final paragraph, by postponing a potential exclusions of specific weapon systems to subsequent negotiation phases.

Thank you, Chair