



## **Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)**

### **11th Review Conference of the Parties**

**New York, 27 April – 22 May 2026**

**Main Committee I**

**Statement delivered by H.E. Ambassador Leonardo Bencini**

***1 May 2026***

Mr Chair,

Congratulations on your election as chair of this Committee.

Italy aligns itself with the statement delivered earlier by the European Union, by Norway on the principle of irreversibility and by Japan on disarmament education. I would like to add the following remarks in my national capacity.

Italy believes that a secure and peaceful world must ultimately be a world free of nuclear weapons. This is the goal that should guide our collective efforts. But nuclear disarmament does not happen in a vacuum; it can be achieved through a progressive approach, grounded in concrete measures. It should result in an effective, verifiable, and irreversible process that promotes undiminished security for all. Through Article VI, the NPT provides the only realistic legal framework for achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

In the face of the current geopolitical tensions, the adoption of measures targeted towards the reduction of nuclear risk becomes even more important. We reject the false dichotomy between nuclear disarmament and nuclear risk reduction. In fact, the two go hand in hand. Far from being a substitute for nuclear disarmament, risk reduction is a necessary tool not only to prevent nuclear war but also to build trust and foster a climate conducive to arms control and disarmament negotiations.

While recognizing the meaningful role non-nuclear-weapon States can play in advancing risk reduction initiatives, we emphasize that the primary responsibility rests with nuclear-weapon States. We call for the adoption of a range of concrete measures, among them I would recall negative security assurances; technically safe and secure, channels of communication; ballistic missile and space launch notification mechanisms; intensified dialogue between and among nuclear-weapon States on policies and measures and information-sharing initiatives; de-alerting and de-targeting.

We welcome the statement delivered a while ago by the UK Ambassador whereby France, the United Kingdom and the United States commit to strategic stability talks and to the establishment of a transparency mechanism in the review process. We also welcome measures already taken by the P3 to promote effective transparency, including by presenting and discussing their respective reports at this Review Conference in an open and interactive manner. We call on others to follow suit.

Italy has submitted its National Report as a conference document for this Review Conference. We consider transparency an essential step to advance nuclear disarmament. Transparency fosters accountability; it also helps build confidence and trust among States and therefore it promotes dialogue and negotiation on concrete and effective measures. We hope that some of the proposals presented and discussed within the 2023 Working Group on the further strengthening of the Review Process, including on transparency and reporting, can make their way into the final document of this Review Conference

The absence of testing is an essential contribution to irreversible disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the thirtieth anniversary of the signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, it is more pressing than ever that the remaining Annex 2 States that have not yet done so take urgent steps to ratify the Treaty so as to allow its entry into force. In the meanwhile, we call on all nuclear-weapon States to uphold their long-standing moratoria on nuclear testing and adhere to a zero-yield standard.

The role of artificial intelligence and its responsible application in the nuclear domain is garnering growing attention. It is important to examine whether, and to what extent, the integration of AI into decision-making processes could affect strategic stability, including by potentially increasing the risk of unintended escalation. At the same time, consideration should be given to the ways in which AI might contribute to strategic risk reduction and to nuclear disarmament verification.

In this regard, we welcome the ongoing work of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, as well as the establishment of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.