



Permanent Mission of Italy to  
the Conference on Disarmament  
Geneva

**Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)**

**11th Review Conference of the Parties**

**New York, 27 April – 22 May 2026**

**Statement delivered by H.E. Ambassador Leonardo Bencini**

**Main Committee I**

***15 May 2026***

Mr Chair,

At the outset, I would like to thank you, and through you the President and the Secretariat, for this revised draft. We can see the effort to produce a balanced text and consider that several parts have improved, as far as we are concerned, but others remain unsatisfactory.

In the preambular section, we welcome the introduction of the reference to the historic achievements of the NPT over the past five decades of its existence, as we believe this Treaty provides the norm and the foundation for an international regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons around the world, greatly contributing to international peace and security.

We also appreciate the addition in the Preamble of the language on nuclear testing.

Concerning paragraph 2, while we consider this text an improvement on the previous version, the text still does not go far enough in our view to recognize the positive contribution these arrangements have brought to the Treaty in helping ensure non-proliferation in Europe. We see that the reference to the credibility to the Treaty has been removed and that we no longer mention concerns on new arrangements.

However, the text now refers to “nuclear weapons sharing”, which is factually incorrect. In light of all the above, either the text is redrafted accordingly or it is simply removed.

In line with our previous comments, we strongly support the elements on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), including the call on the Nuclear-Weapon States to maintain the existing moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests, pending the entry into force of the CTBT. We welcome the introduction in p. 52 of the reference to the International Monitoring System (IMS), being at the core of the verification regime provided for by the Treaty, and the reference to the “explosion of any yields” in paragraph 54, as the absence of any testing is an essential contribution to irreversible disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We still have reservations on paragraph 63, former paragraph 64, as we still do not consider it appropriate to refer to reporting requirements on the implementation of disarmament commitments for non-nuclear weapon States. We also do not understand why the reference to nuclear weapons States with regard to the implementation of article VI has been removed from paragraph 64. We believe it should be reinserted.

We welcome in paragraph 68, the reference to immediately commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and, pending its negotiation, the call on Nuclear Weapon States to maintain or declare moratoriums on its production in paragraph 70. This moratorium in particular is a very important point.

Concerning paragraph 55, we would prefer language on multilateral strategic stability talks along the lines of that contained in the P3 joint statement delivered by the United Kingdom in Main Committee 1 two weeks ago.

Finally, we have problems with paragraph 59 as it seems to reflect only one particular view expressed in the debate. This is a declaratory policy that cannot be verified. As this is drafted now, we cannot accept it.

Thank you, Chair.

